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INTRODUCTION
As with any Restatement, Employment Law1 reflects a tension be-
tween faithfully reflecting the prevailing law and improving that law by
choosing the better rule.  Perhaps more than most Restatements, how-
ever, Employment Law was resisted at the outset precisely because of
concerns that it would faithfully reflect at least the dominant themes of
the current law, thereby tending to “freeze” the law in undesirable
forms.  That was because, in the view of the opponents, the case law
was overly deferential to employers.2  At the end of the project, per-
haps no better example of this prediction being borne out is the
† Professor of Law, Seton Hall Law School.  B.A., Siena College, 1965; LL.B., Harvard
Law School, 1968.  I want to thank Steve Willborn for raising some of the problems I dis-
cuss and for a number of insightful comments on earlier drafts.  Thanks also to my re-
search assistants, John G. Dumnich and Angela R. Raleigh, Seton Hall class of 2016.
1 Often referred to throughout the consideration process as the “Restatement
(Third) of Employment Law” (as a part of the American Law Institute’s third series of
Restatements), the final product’s official title will simply be the “Restatement of Employ-
ment Law,” thus avoiding the awkward question of why first and second versions do not
exist.
2 The Labor Law Group was generally hostile to restating employment law. See gener-
ally Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Conference on the American Law Institute’s Proposed Restatement
of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 10–12 (2009).  In 2007, a petition from
the Group to the American Law Institute, signed by more than sixty academics, including
many of the leading lights of the discipline, argued:
[T]he whole thrust of the project [was] misplaced.  We submit that the ve-
locity and direction of legal change in the employment relationship is inca-
pable of being addressed by a Restatement; that the Restatement method, if it
1391
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chapter on Privacy: although it is actually more progressive than most
of the decided cases, the Restatement nevertheless reflects a very
grudging view of employee privacy rights that will, if influential in the
courts, continue to subordinate employee privacy interests to em-
ployer business concerns.3  But privacy is only the most obvious mani-
festation of the tension between, on the one hand, faithfully counting
judicial noses and, on the other, adopting some better view—often as
expounded in the law reviews and by a few courts that are more em-
ployee friendly than most.
That debate, however, is now over, and we are no longer con-
cerned with whether we should have had an Employment Law Restate-
ment, or at least this Restatement of Employment Law.  Rather, as
litigators like to say, “It is what it is,” and we can sit back and assess the
final product from both the perspective of its relationship to the law
in the courts and to the social ends the project serves.4
proves influential (as the Institute would surely wish it to be), will stultify
legal experimentation and growth.
Id. at app. 2 (reproducing the text of the Labor Law Group’s petition to the ALI Council).
Although that effort was unsuccessful, the Labor Law Group convened two confer-
ences where the same theme emerged, but now in the context of analyzing and criticizing
the project as it wound its way through the laborious processes of the Institute.  In summa-
rizing the contributions to the first conference (held at Hastings College of Law in 2009)
Professor Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Chair of the Group, noted the critique of several com-
mentators that restating a rapidly evolving area would “freeze” or have a chilling effect on
employment-law doctrine.  Some participants were explicit about their concern that the
current state of the case law was far too deferential to employers. Id. at 10. See also Mat-
thew W. Finkin, A Consumer Warning for the Restatement of Employment Law: Read Carefully
Before Applying, 70 LA. L. REV. 193, 194 (2009) (arguing that, at critical junctures where
courts are divided on the law, the then-draft of the Restatement chose an employer-
friendly approach).
By the time of the second conference (held in conjunction with the American Bar
Foundation at Northwestern and Loyola in 2011), it was clear that the Restatement would
be completed, and there was less focus on the desirability of the enterprise than on what
were still seen as serious problems with some of the provisions. See, e.g., Catherine Fisk &
Adam Barry, Contingent Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of Employment
Law, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 417–49 (2012) (arguing that the then-current draft
of the Restatement’s approach to the duty of loyalty restricts employees’ job mobility and is
thus anticompetitive); Michael Selmi, The Restatement’s Supersized Duty of Loyalty Provision,
16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395, 398–99, 404–11 (2012) (arguing that, as then drafted, the
Restatement could change the common-law understanding of the duty of loyalty by
presenting it as a catch-all provision that could displace the need for noncompete agree-
ments or statutory trade-secrets protection).
Unconnected to the Labor Law Group, the Fourth Annual Colloquium on Current
Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law, hosted at Seton Hall Law School in 2009, of-
fered sessions on the Restatement’s “Privacy” chapter and its “Other Torts” chapter at
which Reporters engaged with their critics. See Colloquium, Fourth Annual Colloquium on
Current Scholarship in Labor & Employment Law, (Sept. 25, 2009), http://law.shu.edu/Ab
out/News_Events/labor_employment/upload/program_schedule_speakers.pdf.
3 See generally Steven L. Willborn, Notice, Consent, and Nonconsent: Employee Privacy in
the Restatement, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1423 (2015).
4 I will typically describe the end result as either employer friendly or employee
friendly, a characterization the reporters resist because they believe their mission was
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Such an assessment should be undertaken across the nine chap-
ters that comprise the Restatement of Employment Law.  My task,
however, is more modest: what is the remedial structure of the Re-
statement; what does it say about the law’s view of the employment
relationship; and how faithful is that vision to the cases it purports to
restate?  Most of my treatment of the Restatement’s remedies is con-
fined to Chapter 9, but other chapters bear on remedial questions
and will be noted where appropriate.
One note before commencing.  In May 2014, the American Law
Institute basically approved the document before it, denominated the
“Proposed Final Draft.”5  Such approval, however, is subject to edito-
rial adjustments by the Reporters, and a number of changes have
since been made.  Therefore, citations to “the Restatement of Employ-
ment Law” refer to the current, truly final version, although when
comparisons are drawn between that version and the ALI-approved
document, they are so noted.
I
THE RESTATEMENT’S REMEDIAL STRUCTURE
In contrast to, say, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which
devotes some forty-one sections to various aspects of contract reme-
dies,6 the Employment Restatement is remedy-lite, containing only ten
sections, perhaps reflecting the narrower ambit of this effort.  Six of
these sections deal with employer breaches of duty and four with em-
ployee breaches.  Both are divided between contract- and tort-based
breaches of duty.7
A. Employee Remedies
Three employee-remedy sections provide for damages for three
kinds of contract breaches.  Two deal with damages for termination:
one for “breach of an agreement for a definite or indefinite term of
employment or of a binding employer promise of employment”8 (sec-
tion 9.01) and a second for “breach of a binding policy statement”9
(section 9.02); the third contract-based section deals with employee
predominantly to simply reflect the law as it exists and not to make policy judgments.  I
certainly agree that capturing current doctrine is the major thrust of this, and of all, Re-
statements but would note that this does not immunize the final product from the critiques
either that it replicates a too employer-friendly judicial perspective or that, where the case
law is thin on the ground or pretty evenly divided, this Restatement sometimes reinforces
that slant.
5 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW (proposed final draft April 12, 2014).
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344–85 (1981).
7 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 9.01–9.10 (2015).
8 Id. § 9.01.
9 Id. § 9.02.
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damages for “employer breach other than termination”10 (section
9.03).  A fourth section concludes contract remedies by dealing with
injunctive relief against the employer for breach of contract11 (section
9.04).
The fifth and sixth sections deal with employee remedies for em-
ployer “breach of a tort-based duty,”12 with section 9.05 addressing
damages and section 9.06 dealing with injunctions.
B. Employer Remedies
The four sections for employer remedies are similarly divided be-
tween contract and tort and between damages and injunctive relief.
The first two deal with contract breaches, with section 9.07 providing
for damages for employee breach of an agreement and section 9.08
dealing with injunctive relief for a contract breach.  Section 9.09 then
turns to employee breach of “a tort-based duty or fiduciary duty”13 and
deals with damages remedies while section 9.10 concludes with injunc-
tive relief for such a breach.
II
COMPARING AND CONTRASTING
The following discussion will consider the various remedies pro-
vided for in Employment Law and then analyze the extent to which
these remedies map onto the relevant case law.
A. Injunctive Relief for Contract Breaches
First, although two separate sections deal with “injunctive relief”
for contract breaches, the Restatement has in mind only prohibitory
injunctions since neither employer nor employee gets specific en-
forcement of any promise.14
Although Employment Law is seemingly evenhanded in permitting
both employees and employers to obtain prohibitory injunctive relief
10 Id. § 9.03.  The version of the Restatement approved by the Institute in 2014 was
unclear as to the remedies provided for breaches under Chapter 7.  The final version clari-
fies this by providing that “[a]n employee discharged in violation of the autonomy protec-
tions of § 7.08, which is treated as a violation of contract, is covered by the remedies
provided in § 9.01(b).  Damages for employer violations of the privacy protections in
§§ 7.01–7.07, as with other employer torts, are covered in § 9.05.” Id. § 9.01, cmt. n.
11 Id. § 9.04.
12 Id. §§ 9.05, 9.06.
13 Id. § 9.09.
14 Section 9.04(a) does qualify this by the ubiquitous “[e]xcept as otherwise provided
by law,” but the reference is not so clear.  The most obvious situation in which an order of
instatement or reinstatement will issue is to enforce statutory rights under, say, the
National Labor Relations Act or the antidiscrimination laws.  But these would not be em-
braced within the contract theories referenced by the Restatement in any case.
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(so long as they satisfy “traditional requirements”15), the equivalency
is deceptive.  That is because the structure of section 9.0416 suggests
that there will be few occasions for injunctive relief against employers
for their misconduct whereas section 9.0817 will often provide such
relief for employee breaches.
Unavailability for employees follows both from the “traditional re-
quirements” of equity, most obviously the adequacy of damages as an
alternative remedy, and from the unlikelihood of any appropriate in-
junctive relief once specific performance is ruled out.18  It is true that
the Restatement seems to envision some kinds of mandatory injunc-
tion by speaking of “enforc[ing] positive decrees that do not require
unduly burdensome judicial supervision (e.g., ‘pay the compensation
owed’),”19 but courts of equity do not typically order the payment of
money since, by definition, the remedy at law (a judgment for that
amount) is deemed adequate.20  In short, it is not clear what injunc-
tive relief an employee may obtain once specific performance is
barred.21
In contrast, section 9.08, while ruling out specific performance of
an employee’s promise to work, authorizes “injunctive relief to en-
force any other obligation expressly stated in the employment
agreement if the employer satisfies the traditional requirements for
obtaining equitable relief.”22  This would generally permit a prohibi-
tory injunction to enforce a valid noncompetition (or nondisclosure
15 Id. §§ 9.04, 9.06, 9.08, 9.10.
16 Id. § 9.04(b) (“An employee may obtain injunctive relief to enforce any other term
of an employment agreement (§ 2.03), binding employer promise (§ 2.02, Comment c), or
binding employer policy statement (§ 2.05) if the employee satisfies the traditional re-
quirements for equitable relief.”).
17 Id. § 9.08(b) (“An employer may obtain injunctive relief to enforce any other obli-
gation expressly stated in the employment agreement if the employer satisfies the tradi-
tional requirements for obtaining equitable relief.”).
18 Injunctions may be viewed as prohibitory or mandatory, with specific performance
being a kind of mandatory injunction.  What, exactly, an employer breaching a contract
would be either ordered to do or prohibited from doing (putting instatement and rein-
statement aside) is unclear.
19 Id. § 9.04, cmt. b.
20 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.6(1) (2d ed. 1993).  Of course, some mone-
tary payments are viewed as equitable, such as back pay awards under Title VII, but the
award of earned compensation would generally be viewed as damages for which legal relief
is adequate.
21 Illustration 3 to section 9.04 posits specific enforcement of a promise to pay retir-
ees their medical benefits until they become eligible for Medicare.  It does not explain,
however, why a judgment for the cost of such benefits is not an adequate remedy.  It has
also been suggested that nondisparagement agreements and contracts providing, say, for
maintenance of an employee’s telephone and e-mail may be specifically enforced.  That
seems like a logical possibility but one that is vanishingly unlikely in the real world—both
because injunctive relief is unlikely to be sought for such breaches and because courts are
likely to find a damage remedy available.
22 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.08(b) (2015).
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or nonsolicitation) agreement; indeed, that is the most common and
obvious application of the principle.23
In short, the Restatement of Employment Law provides for in-
junctive relief for employers in most situations when they might want
it and, in substance, denies such relief to employees, except in the
rarest of cases.  The overall assessment: very employer friendly.
But to what extent is this tilt in the Restatement simply a reflec-
tion of the case law?  Denial of specific performance to both employ-
ees and employers for contract breaches breaks no new ground,24 nor
does the application of traditional requirements for equitable relief.
So long as employees’ contractual expectations are generally limited
to their compensation,25 it will be a rare case in which a court would
award injunctive relief to an employee.  And current law often en-
forces post-employment restraints by a prohibitory injunction.26  In
short, at the 30,000-foot level, Employment Law maps pretty well onto
current case law.
Some qualification to this statement might be appropriate when
we look more deeply.  Section 8.08, which could easily have been
placed in the “Remedies” chapter, deals with noncompetition agree-
ments that are unenforceable as written because they impose re-
straints that are unnecessary to satisfy  the employer’s legitimate
interests.27  The Restatement’s remedy is not invalidation but, rather,
to allow a court to issue an otherwise-appropriate injunction after judi-
cial modification to address the overreaching:
A court may delete or modify provisions in an overbroad restrictive
covenant in an employment agreement and then enforce the cove-
nant as modified unless the agreement does not allow for modifica-
tion or the employer lacked a reasonable and good-faith basis for
believing the covenant was enforceable.28
Again, this seems a very employer-friendly stance,29 but is it one that
faithfully reflects the extant case law?
23 It might also reach prohibitory “enforcement” of a contract to work for the em-
ployer during its term; that is, a court will not order specific enforcement but may order
the employee not to work for someone else during the term of the contract. See infra note
125. R
24 See DOBBS, supra note 20, §§ 12.21(4), 12.22(2). R
25 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.  The availability of consequential damages R
may alter this in a few cases.
26 See e.g., Firstenergy Solutions Corp. v. Flerick, 521 F. App’x 521, 526–30 (6th Cir.
2013) (affirming district court’s granting of preliminary injunction to enforce noncompete
covenants against former employee); Arthur J. Gallagher Serv. Co. v. Egan, 514 F. App’x
839, 843 (11th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s granting of preliminary injunction to
enforce nondisclosure and noncompetition covenants against former employee).
27 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.08 (2015).
28 Id.
29 One comment suggests that the alternative of “only a binary ‘enforce or reject’
choice can also lead over time to a legal regime that provides employers with an incentive
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Here, the answer is not so clear.30  It is true that most courts
adopt some version of this rule (sometimes called a “liberal blue pen-
cil” rule31), but a number of jurisdictions refuse to modify covenants
at all or follow a “strict blue pencil” rule, which would modify cove-
nants only if the overbroad portion can be stricken without affecting
the grammatical sense of the restraint.32  In short, current standards
for when to modify an overbroad restraint are conflicting, and the
Restatement chose the one favoring employers, although, admittedly,
that is probably also the majority rule.
Or at least that is one reading.  The Restatement attempts to
counterbalance its approval of modification by requiring a reasonable
and good-faith basis for the employer’s belief that the covenant is en-
forceable.33  This is a step forward because it is not clear whether the
courts now allowing partial enforcement are concerned primarily
about the intent of the employer in drafting the clause.34  In addition,
the provision goes on to specify that lack of such a basis “may be mani-
fested by [the restraint’s] gross overbreadth alone, or by overbreadth
coupled with other evidence that the employer sought to do more
than protect its legitimate interests,”35 which may provide useful gui-
dance.  Further, the current practice of employers using off-the-shelf
noncompetition clauses across either their whole workforce36 or at
least a wide swath of management positions without regard for any
to draft overly broad covenants that employees will similarly regard as enforceable, due to
judicial unwillingness to completely reject a covenant that is partially valid.” Id. § 8.08,
cmt. a.  Although this is a logical possibility, I know of no evidence that it is more likely
than the contrary possibility: that fear of invalidity will lead employers to draft narrower
covenants.
30 See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The Puzzling Persistence of Unenforceable Contract
Terms, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 1127 (2009).
31 See Jon P. McClanahan & Kimberly M. Burke, Sharpening the Blunt Blue Pencil: Re-
newing the Reasons for Covenants Not to Compete in North Carolina, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1931, 1935
(2012).
32 See generally id. (discussing courts’ three different approaches to treating unreasona-
ble covenants: all-or-nothing, strict blue pencil, and liberal blue-pencil approaches).
33 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184(2) (1981) would allow a court to
“treat only part of a term as unenforceable . . . if the party who seeks to enforce the term
obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”
34 While “good faith” does appear in a number of cases dealing with “blue pencil”
issues, it does not appear in most of the opinions.  “Blue pencil” appeared in 841 federal
and state cases; either “good faith” or “bad faith” appeared in only 156 of those decisions
(search conducted on Lexis Advance, Mar. 21, 2015).  Of course, it is possible that the
courts are applying some version of good faith without using that term.
35 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.08 (2015).  The section places the burden on the
employer of showing good faith once overbreadth is established. Id. § 8.08, cmt. a.
36 See Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete Clause, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/upshot/when-the-guy-mak
ing-your-sandwich-has-a-noncompete-clause.html (“[E]mployers are now insisting that
workers in a surprising variety of relatively low- and moderate-paid jobs sign noncompete
agreements.”).
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possible threat to unfair competition by any given individual might
lead a court to rely on the literal language of the Restatement to strike
down such clauses on a wholesale basis.
With that caveat, the end result is that both the Restatement and
the current law are employer friendly, and, to the extent that there
was a division in the jurisdictions on relevant issues, the Restatement
chose to come down on the employer side of the split—which, admit-
tedly, was also the majority view.
B. Damages for Contract Breach
The Restatement takes an evenhanded approach to contract-
based damages for both employers and employees, with the most re-
cent revisions addressing some inadvertent problems with the Pro-
posed Final Draft.37  Thus, the Restatement now both makes clear that
restitutionary remedies are available when otherwise appropriate38
and provides that the basic damages remedy for contract-based harm
is lost compensation (less mitigation), regardless of whether the
breach is of a term agreement39 or a binding policy statement,40 and
regardless of whether the harm is from wrongful termination or other
employer breach.41  Further, the Restatement recognizes that “reason-
37 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 9.01–9.10 (proposed final draft April 2014).
38 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. m (“Restitutionary relief ‘off the con-
tract’ may be available in certain circumstances. . . . For instance, if an employee is dis-
charged in violation of an oral agreement that is not enforceable for lack of a writing
under the applicable statute of frauds, the employee may recover in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of services rendered.”), and related Reporters’ Notes (2015).  As the
Restatement suggests, recovery would be measured by the reasonable value of services ren-
dered, not limited by the contract price. See DOBBS, supra note 20, § 12.21(3). R
The Restatement also does not generally address restitutionary recovery by an em-
ployer, although it does address the faithless servant rule in section 9.09. See infra note 159. R
Restitution is sometimes a remedy for material breaches of contract, requiring the return
of any benefit that was paid to one party unjustly enriching him. See Fort Wash. Res. v.
Tannen, 901 F. Supp. 932, 943–44 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (awarding as “damages” the compensa-
tion paid the employee, although such a recovery would more properly be viewed as
restitution).
39 Section 9.01(a) states:
An employer who lacks cause for terminating the employment of an em-
ployee with an unexpired agreement for a definite term (§ 2.03-2.04) is
subject to liability to the discharged employee for (1) all compensation that
the employee would have received under the remaining term of the agree-
ment, less mitigation of losses (such as the compensation earned and that
reasonably could have been earned from comparable alternative employ-
ment during the remaining term), (2) reasonably foreseeable consequent-
ial damages, and (3) the expenses of reasonable efforts (whether or not
successful) to mitigate losses.
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01(a) (2015) (cross-references omitted); see also id.
§ 9.01(b) (substantially the same rule for breach of “an agreement for an indefinite term
requiring cause for termination”).
40 Id. § 9.02.
41 Id. § 9.03.
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ably foreseeable consequential damages” are also available for any
contract breach.42
With respect to consequential damages, the blackletter is rein-
forced by the comments, which treat consequential damages under
two headings.  The more restrictive, comment j, is entitled
“Noneconomic damages,” and rejects liability for either harm to repu-
tation or emotional distress.43  This is clearly in line with current law,
although, as Professor Hyde has argued, current law woefully un-
dercompensates wrongfully discharged employees, considering the
emotional and psychological costs often accompanying loss of
employment.44
Comment k, then, deals with consequential damages more gener-
ally.45  It cites the Contracts Restatement’s version46 of the Hadley v.
Baxendale foreseeability rule47 and provides three illustrations.  One
would allow medical expenses that would have been covered by em-
ployer-provided health insurance had plaintiff not been wrongfully
fired.48
The second Illustration of the Restatement, however, takes a step
back from the Proposed Final Draft.  The prior version would have
allowed recovery of medical expenses even if the employer did not
provide insurance when the employee’s discharge left him unable to
pay for coverage: the employer would have had “reason to foresee
[these losses] as the probable result of the breach when the contract
was made.”49  The final Restatement marks a major retreat from this,
rejecting such recovery with the explanation that “expenses caused by
breach of an obligation to pay money are deemed covered by interest
42 Id. §§ 9.01(3), 9.02(3), 9.03.
43 Id. § 9.01, cmt. j.  This is consistent with general contract law, which rarely allows
recovery of emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981); see
also Bowers v. Campbell, No. 00-60317, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 31705, at *11–12 (5th Cir.
Feb. 21, 2001) (no emotional distress damages for anxiety and humiliation caused by em-
ployer’s termination of employee); Nicholas v. Penn. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 147 (3d
Cir. 2000) (no emotional distress damages for depression caused by employer’s breach of
contract). But see Walker v. Bd. of Trs., 69 F. App’x. 953, 961–62 (10th Cir. 2003) (emo-
tional distress damages recoverable under Colorado law for “willful and wanton” contract
breach of pension plan’s promises).
44 See Alan Hyde, What Should the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law Say About Reme-
dies?, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 497, 499–501 (2012); see also Sachin S. Pandya, Presuming
Damages for Unemployment Distress, 19 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 85, 87–89 (2015) (arguing
that under existing state contract and tort law, wrongfully discharged employees rarely
recover damages for “unemployment distress” in part because of the uncertainty of metrics
and suggesting an approach to address that problem).
45 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. k (2015).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981).
47 (1854) 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145.
48 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 15 (2015).
49 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. k (proposed final draft April 12, 2014)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (1981)).
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on any judgment obtained and are generally not recoverable as conse-
quential damages.”50  The Reporters’ Notes to this provision recog-
nize the general rule about recovery for promises to pay money while
raising a question as to whether it should apply where the claim at
issue is “an effort to recover the lost job, not in the first instance the
lost income from that job”;51 they also cite several cases which “edg[e]
away” from the full implications of the general rule but do not “di-
rectly challenge[ ] that rule.”52  Given the authority in the employ-
ment context favoring the employee in this situation, the about-face of
the final Restatement on this issue is inexplicable.  Further, at least
where the terminated employee lacks the funds to obtain such insur-
ance,53 application of the general rule seems more a legal fiction than
an effort to apply the foreseeability principle to the facts on the
ground.54
The third Illustration dealing with consequential damages for an
employee would deny an employee recovery “for lost professional op-
portunities unless [plaintiff] can show that the breach of contract
caused the loss of identifiable opportunities.”55  This seems to confuse
foreseeability with ascertainability but, in any event, would allow recov-
ery, so this comment is, unlike Illustration 16, employee friendly.
In sum, Employment Law generally tracks general contract law as to
foreseeable consequential damages, but arguably misapplies that law
to the employee’s disadvantage in the health insurance example, with
regrettable potential consequences not just in that scenario but in any
case in which the otherwise foreseeable consequences of the em-
ployer’s breach can be viewed as stemming from the loss of income.
As for employers’ remedies, Employment Law seems to break new
ground in employees’ favor by limiting damages liability only to “any
obligation that is clearly stated in the employment agreement to be a
50 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 16 (2015).
51 Id. § 9.01, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. k.
52 Id.
53 If such funds were available, the duty of mitigation would presumably bar recovery
for losses that could have been insured.  Illustration 15 thus allows recovery for “the costs
of alternative health insurance covering that illness if available.” Id. § 9.01, illus. 15.
54 One might also question whether Illustration 16 is consistent with Illustration 15 in
any but the most formal of terms.  If the employee promises insurance, Illustration 15
allows recovery of the costs of medical expenses; if there is only a promise of salary, Illustra-
tion 16 denies such recovery.  In one case, the Restatement makes the employee whole; in
the other it does not.
55 Id. § 9.01, illus. 17.  The illustration is based on Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orches-
tra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 893–94 (1st Cir. 1988), where plaintiff’s discharge in violation of her
contract also caused her loss of a specific second engagement. Cf. Ericson v. Playgirl, Inc.,
140 Cal. Rptr. 921, 926 (Ct. App. 1977) (loss of publicity value from cancelled contract for
a model on a magazine cover was too speculative).
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basis for damages liability.”56  It also attempts to limit such liability by
requiring the express agreement to be in an “agreement,” not a “uni-
lateral employer policy statement or other promulgation.”57  The Re-
statement, however, does not address whether such an “agreement”
can be similar to formal acknowledgements of at-will status typically
executed at the outset of employment, which would permit employers
to largely evade the thrust of the provision.58
Assuming an express provision for liability for damages, the
blackletter states that the employer’s remedies for employee contract
breach extend to the full scope of “foreseeable economic loss that the
employer could not have reasonably avoided.”59  This phrasing might
permit recovery for the excess costs of hiring a replacement,60 which
is the most obvious “general damages”61 an employer suffers when an
employee breaches by departing, but it obviously embraces conse-
quential damages for the employer in all cases.
This employer recovery, however, is limited in two respects.  First,
if an adequate replacement is immediately available, most “foresee-
able economic loss” can be avoided, but that, of course, is true for
employees also.  Second, the Restatement provides that such eco-
nomic loss “does not include lost profits caused by the employee’s
breach.”62  That exception would seem to largely negate the breadth
of the rule, but it, in turn, is essentially negated by the qualifying lan-
guage: “[U]nless the agreement expressly provides for such recovery
or the employee knew or should have known that the employee would
be held responsible for lost profits caused by the employee’s
breach.”63
56 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.07(a) (2015).  This is reinforced by the illustrations
to section 9.07.  Thus, Illustration 1, which allows liability for the costs of a replacement but
specifies an express provision to that effect, while Illustration 2 denies such liability absent
such a provision. But see id. § 9.07, illus. 5 (making the breaching employee liable for costs
of a replacement with no indication of an express assumption of such liability although
exonerating her from liability for lost profits).
57 Id. § 9.07, cmt. c, illus. 3, 4.
58 As noted in the text accompanying infra note 162, employers rarely sue their em- R
ployees since discharge is typically a more effective remedy.  Thus, the law on employee
liability in damages is underdeveloped.  However, the case upon which Illustration 1 is
premised, Handicapped Children’s Education Board v. Lukaszewski, 332 N.W.2d 774, 778–79
(Wis. 1983), imposed upon the breaching employee the costs of a replacement without any
express undertaking by her to assume such liability.
59 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.07(a) (2015).
60 Illustration 5 to section 9.07 does allow the recovery of the excess costs of a replace-
ment.  Illustration 1 to section 9.07 also so provides but seems to do so only because the
breaching employee has signed an agreement expressly making her liable for the reasona-
ble costs of securing a replacement.
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351, cmt. b (1981) (definition of “general
damages”).
62 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.07(b) (2015).
63 Id.
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In other words, employers can require employees to agree to the
recovery of consequential damages in the form of lost profits,64 and,
even lacking such an agreement, lost profits are recoverable by em-
ployers when they are a foreseeable consequence of the breach, i.e.,
that the employee “knew or should have known that the employee
would be held responsible for lost profits.”65  Because foreseeability is
always a prerequisite to recovery of consequential damages, it is not
clear what the point of the convoluted phrasing is.
The overall damages remedies conform to general contracts rem-
edies even if Employment Law does not conform to the structure of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  Traditional contracts doctrine
generally vindicates the injured party’s expectation interest, which
means giving her a sum that will put her in the position she would
have occupied had the contract been performed.66  To compute this,
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts divides damages into (1) the
loss of value of the denied or defective performance67 and (2) “any
other loss, including incidental or consequential loss.”68  From the
sum of these damages, the injured party must deduct any loss avoided
by not having to perform.69  Further, all damages have to be foresee-
able to be recoverable,70 although some losses—such as loss in value
from not receiving the other party’s performance—easily pass this
test.  Finally, no damages are recoverable that “the injured party could
have avoided without undue risk, burden or humiliation.”71
As applied to the employment setting, this approach would pro-
vide the wrongfully terminated employee with the agreed compensa-
tion (loss in value because of the other party’s nonperformance)72
minus amounts earned or earnable in mitigation.  The employee may
or may not suffer consequential damages from the breach, but the
Contracts Restatement would allow them so long as they were
64 This seems very problematic.  As framed, the employee’s agreement would seem to
permit the employer to recover lost profits no matter how unforeseeable they were at the
time the agreement was entered into.  Given the ability of many employers to extract from
most employees whatever agreements they desire, the Restatement at least creates the op-
portunity for lost-profit recoveries as a matter of course.
65 Id.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981).
67 Id. § 347(a).
68 Id. § 347(b).
69 Id. § 347(c).
70 Id. § 351.
71 Id. § 350.
72 “Compensation” is defined broadly enough to match what more general contract
analysis would call “contract price.” See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 478 (§ 12.21(2)) (“An R
employee wrongfully discharged in violation of contract may recover damages measured by
the contract price, less replacement income under the avoidable consequences rules, plus
recoverable consequential damages.”).
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foreseeable.73  There would be no loss avoided to deduct.74  In short,
as far as employees are concerned, the Employment Restatement
seems to end up at more or less the same place as the Contracts Re-
statement, with the notable limitation on recovery of any consequent-
ial damages flowing from loss of income.
With respect to the employer, Employment Law seems more convo-
luted than the Contracts Restatement but also seems to end up in the
same place.  The latter would view the employer’s loss in value as any
additional cost of hiring a replacement for the breaching employee—
that is, any amount higher than the breaching employee’s contracted-
for compensation.75  It would allow consequential damages when
foreseeable, ascertainable,76 and not avoidable, and Employment Law
does the same.77
73 This is somewhat of a term of art since the courts generally deem certain damages
almost per se not foreseeable, such as emotional distress or reputational harm. See supra
note 43 and accompanying text.  However, the courts have found a number of economic R
harms recoverable when the injured party is able to establish that the economic harms
were both foreseeable and ascertainable. See O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 305
F.3d 1222, 1226–27 (10th Cir. 2002), later proceedings, 364 F. App’x 472, 476–78 (10th Cir.
2010) (multiple items of consequential damages recoverable for failure of the employer to
pay promised relocation expenses); Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855
F.2d 888, 893–94 (1st Cir. 1988) (recovery allowed for loss of “identifiable professional
opportunities”); Chrabaszcz v. Johnston Sch. Comm., 474 F. Supp. 2d 298, 316 (D.R.I.
2007) (holding that the jury could reasonably have found that damages for failure to ob-
tain one of two identified other positions were caused by employer’s breach); Medical
Assocs. of Clinton, P.L.C. v. Martin, No. 13-1358, 2014 Iowa App. LEXIS 707, at *18–20
(Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014) (awarding mortgage payments and other costs of maintaining
former residence until its sale as a foreseeable consequence of the employer’s breach
where a noncompetition clause precluded the plaintiff physician from working within fifty
miles of his former practice); see also Nassar v. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr., 674 F.3d 448,
455 (5th Cir. 2012) (backpay in a Title VII suit does not include a loss in honoraria earn-
ings because honoraria were paid by third parties, not by the employer, and were not
required under the terms of employment; recovery for such losses may nevertheless be had
as compensatory damages), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); cf. Rice v. Cmty.
Health Ass’n, 118 F. Supp. 2d 697, 701–04 (S.D. W.Va. 2000) (plaintiff could not recover
for reputational harms per se and did not adequately establish specific lost opportunities).
74 While the employee gains leisure from the breach where she cannot mitigate by
finding alternative employment, no court has deducted any value of such leisure from an
employee’s recovery. But see Mitchell L. Engler, Pay for Play: The Compensated Leisure Flaw of
Contract Damages, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 297, 322 (2015) (arguing for avoiding overcom-
pensation of employees who gain leisure when an employment contract is breached).
75 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347, cmt. a (1981) (an injured party
can recover damages “where the injured party has simply had to pay an additional amount
to arrange a substitute transaction”).
76 See, e.g., R.K. Chevrolet v. Hayden, 480 S.E.2d 477, 481 (Va. 1997) (lost profits in
used-car department of auto dealership following defendant’s departure may be recover-
able where neither the new-car department nor the industry as a whole had similar de-
clines during that period).
77 See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  Not all courts allow such recovery. R
For example, Willis v. Rehab Solutions, PLLC, 82 So. 3d 583 (Miss. 2012), although a some-
what convoluted opinion, seems to reject any recovery for an at-will employee’s mere negli-
gence in performing his duty, suggesting that the sole remedy is discharge. See id. at
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In sum, at this level, Employment Law seems largely to track the
Contracts Restatement.  As with injunctive relief, however, a deeper
dive into the Proposed Final Draft suggested that Employment Law was
less balanced than it first appeared and not as well grounded in the
common law as it would seem.  To the credit of the Reporters, the
most recent revisions go a long way toward addressing these con-
cerns—although some problems remain.78
As we have seen, employee recovery is subject to the mitigation
principle although it is sometimes framed in terms of damages that
could not have been “reasonably avoided” rather than “mitigation.”79
Formally, the principle is framed neutrally because it also applies to
employer recovery.80  In short, the Restatement blackletter seems to
subject both sides to the same rule.
While there is rarely a problem with subtracting actual earnings
in substitute employment,81 issues arise as to what positions should
count as reasonable mitigation when the employee fails to seek or ob-
tain such employment.  In general, Employment Law follows the com-
mon law or, indeed, takes a more employee-friendly approach to what
an employee is required or allowed to do to mitigate.82  In one re-
spect, however, it takes a decidedly less hospitable view, which might
have serious adverse consequences should courts follow the Restate-
ment’s lead.
588–89 (holding that negligence was not “a viable cause of action when an at-will employee
fails to do his or her job” and that unjust enrichment was not available for recovering an
employee’s past wages absent “some type of special agreement providing such relief,”
seemingly implicitly rejecting the more intuitive contract-breach claim for foreseeable
damages).
78 One is the explicit provision that permits the parties to “specify in the agreement a
reasonable amount to be paid by the employer for termination with or without cause in
lieu of the measure of damages stated in [this section].” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 9.01(c) (2015).  Three illustrations provide some gloss on this.  One suggests that an
employer may, in effect, waive its right to employee mitigation, id. § 9.01, illus. 10, and
another approves of a reduction in damages if reasonable efforts are not made to mitigate
losses, id. § 9.01, illus. 11.  Although such clauses are common in many contractual con-
texts, they are a relatively new feature of employment contracts and, given the stronger
economic positions employers typically hold, can be expected to negate much of the de-
fault remedies provisions in the entire Restatement.  Illustration 12 does say that a $1,000
limitation on recovery would not be enforceable as a reasonable liquidated-damages
clause. Id. § 9.01, illus. 12.  Thus the Restatement envisions some limitations on employers
obtaining employee agreement to limitations on recovery.
79 Id. §§ 9.07(a), 9.09(a).
80 See id. §§ 9.01(a)–(b), 9.02.
81 See DOBBS, supra note 20, at 480 (§ 12.21(2)) (“[T]he defendant is entitled to a R
credit for any income the plaintiff actually earns in lieu of the employment income.”).  The
“in lieu of” principle suggests that income that would have been earned had the employer
not breached, say, in a moonlighting job, does not count as mitigation.
82 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, Reporters Notes, cmt. f (2015) (discussing
the Restatement’s treatment of the mitigation requirement).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-6\CRN606.txt unknown Seq: 15 10-SEP-15 12:51
2015] RESTATING EMPLOYMENT REMEDIES 1405
Although the cases use various terms to describe what employ-
ment will count as mitigation (“comparable,” “substitute,” “of similar
rank or status,” “not inferior,” and “in the same geographic area”),83
the blackletter of Employment Law speaks only of “comparable alterna-
tive employment.”84  That is broadly consistent with the case law, but
the Restatement’s comments and illustrations reflect somewhat con-
flicting views, some not so employee friendly.
Thus, comment f to section 9.01 speaks of limiting recovery to
“damages that could not have been ‘avoided without undue risk, bur-
den or humiliation,’” citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
section 350(1).85  If the employee does take affirmative steps to miti-
gate, Employment Law is deferential to the employee’s judgment.  Illus-
tration 6 generally finds the duty satisfied by efforts that seem
reasonably likely to yield income, even if they fail to do so or if the
new employment is different from the prior employment.  Thus, it
approves both a move to another state and starting a new business as
reasonable mitigation: “E’s return to California [from Florida] was
reasonable because that was where E lived and worked prior to ac-
cepting the job offer from X.  The business that E started involved a
skill set comparable to the skill set involved in his prior employment
with X.”86  In contrast, Illustration 7 finds mitigation not reasonable
when plaintiff moves to a state where he had not previously lived,
starts in “a completely different line of business,” and, after it fails,
does not seek other employment.87  These examples suggest that a
plaintiff will be allowed to do much in mitigation so long as there is a
reasonable expectation of earnings but do not cast much light on
what the plaintiff is required to do.
83 The Reporters’ Notes, id., cite a number of cases with such formulations, including:
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231–32, 235–36 (1982) (“substantially equivalent”
job and plaintiff “need not go into another line of work, accept a demotion, or take a
demeaning position”); Kern v. Levolor Loentzen, Inc., 899 F.2d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 1990)
(“‘comparable, or substantially similar,’ employment” (citing Parker v. Twentieth Century-
Fox Film Corp., 474 P.2d 689, 692 (Cal. 1970) (en banc)); Flanigan v. Prudential Federal
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 720 P.2d 257, 264 (Mont. 1986) (no “inferior employment”); see also
West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff’s efforts
to mitigate need not be successful but must represent an honest effort to find substantially
equivalent work.” (internal citations omitted)).
84 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW §§ 9.01(a)-(b), 9.02 (2015).
85 Id. § 9.01, cmt. f (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981)).
86 Id. § 9.01, illus. 6; see Jackson v. Host Int’l, Inc., 426 F. App’x 215, 222 (5th Cir.
2011) (self-employment may be mitigation); Serricchio v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 606 F.
Supp. 2d 256, 264 (D. Conn. 2009) (plaintiff mitigated damages by establishing a tanning
salon start-up with his wife).
87 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 7 (2015). While it may be correct that the
plaintiff in this scenario did not make reasonable efforts to mitigate, the Illustration would
be wrong if it suggests that such proof is sufficient to reduce his recovery: such proof
should not carry the employer’s burden without further proof that, had such efforts been
made, they would have been successful. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. R
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That issue is addressed in the next two illustrations.  Illustration 8
essentially recapitulates the well-known facts of Parker v. Twentieth Cen-
tury-Fox Film Corp.,88 in which the court approved a finding of no fail-
ure to mitigate despite the refusal of an actress (Shirley MacLaine) to
take a substitute starring role when the film for which she was origi-
nally hired was cancelled.89  Although the dissent in Parker argued that
the majority was too deferential to the employee’s view of suitable sub-
stitute employment,90 the Restatement approves of the result: “A’s re-
quirement to reasonably mitigate losses does not require her to accept
the ‘Big Country’ [substitute] offer.  In the circumstances of this case,
considering the reputational costs to A in appearing in a different
type of motion picture for which she was not known and which re-
quired work in a different part of the world, the ‘Big Country’ film did
not constitute comparable alternative employment.”91
In contrast, Illustration 9 involves “a well-known stunt man used
in motion-picture musicals and dramas” who is terminated in breach
of contract for the same film; unlike the “famous cinema actress” in
Illustration 8, the stunt man may not recover damages that could have
been avoided by accepting alternative employment doing the same
kind of work in the same geographic area.92  Presumably, this plaintiff
would have no reputational costs, and, because the substitute is other-
wise comparable, it would have been reasonable mitigation.
The illustrations, then, provide one benchmark for determining
comparability—reputational consequences—but do not otherwise
yield much in the way of guidance.  However, because they draw a
distinction between working “in a different part of the world”93 and
88 474 P.2d at 689.
89 See id. at 693–94; RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 8 (2015).
90 Parker, 474 P.2d at 697 (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
91 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 8 (2015).  Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-
Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1397, 1403 (2009) (quoting Victor P. Goldberg,
Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade Picture, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 1051, 1052
(1998)), recognizes that “[t]he conduct countenanced in Parker might be quite wasteful.
MacLaine did no work for fourteen weeks at a time when she ‘was one of the biggest
female stars in Hollywood.’”  He nevertheless justifies the decision:
Had MacLaine taken the role, she would have been denied damages for her
artistic, political, or reputational loss, as any estimate of the loss would be
speculative.  The only way MacLaine could avoid suffering an uncompen-
sated loss was to do what she did, which was to reject the role in Big Country,
Big Man and get a judgment for the contract price.
A famous article, Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1114–25 (1985), suggests that MacLaine might have been
driven by ideological, i.e., feminist, concerns, in taking the role in the cancelled film.  Dep-
rivation of that benefit would broaden Gergen’s “reputational” analysis by introducing yet
another “damage” that contract law cannot measure and therefore cannot compensate but
which would factor into the mitigation analysis.
92 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 9 (2015).
93 Id. § 9.01, illus. 8.
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working in the same geographical area, we might infer that that is an
important factor.  That and the repeated reference to “comparable
alternative employment”94 suggest that Employment Law more or less
tracks the case law and is generally employee friendly.
This deference to the employee’s view of reasonable alternatives,
however, is undercut—to what degree remains to be seen—by the Re-
statement’s comment g, entitled “Reasonable mitigation over time.” It
would allow a discharged employee to initially (“[s]oon after termina-
tion, and for a reasonable period thereafter”) “seek only work involv-
ing comparable skill and working conditions,” but it would also
require the employee to become less particular over time: when a
search for such comparable work is not successful, “at some point it
becomes reasonable to take similar work that is available, even if not
as desirable as the previous employment.”95  This is a version of the
“lowered-sights” doctrine, which has been adopted in some federal
settings96 and at least one state court,97 but it is far from the majority
rule.  The Restatement’s “not as desirable” alternative is limited to
“similar” work98 (apparently less alike than “comparable”), which
might suggest no huge change is intended, but there are other indica-
tions that the reporters mean to adopt a robust version of the de-
manding “lowered-sights” doctrine.99  Thus, comment g goes on to
94 Id. §§ 9.01(a)–(b), 9.02.
95 Id. § 9.01, cmt. g.
96 The Reporters’ Notes also cite cases that apply such a principle in statutory con-
texts: Tubari Ltd., Inc. v. NLRB, 959 F.2d 451, 456 (3d Cir. 1992) (“But the duty to lower
one’s sights arises only after a reasonably diligent search for employment similar to that
lost has been made.  Doubts as to whether or when a discriminatee must lower his or her
sights are resolved against the employer.” (paraphrasing NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc.,
472 F.2d 1307, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, Local 201,
170 F.3d 1111, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1999))). RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, Reporters’
Notes, cmt. g (2015).  The Supreme Court noted, without endorsing, this approach in the
NLRB context. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n.16 (1982) (“Some lower
courts have indicated, however, that after an extended period of time searching for work
without success, a claimant must consider taking a lower-paying position.”).
97 New Jersey uses a “lowered sights” rule for mitigation under its Law Against Dis-
crimination. E.g., Goodman v. London Metals Exch., Inc., 429 A.2d 341, 352 (N.J. 1981)
(“If, after a reasonable amount of time, an employee has been unable to secure closely
comparable employment, available employment may be determined by expanding the type
of service sought, provided he is suited, or by reducing the salary demanded, or by enlarg-
ing the geographical area in which the individual should accept employment.”); O’Lone v.
Dep’t of Human Serv., 814 A.2d 665, 672 (N.J. App. Div. 2003) (applying the “lowered
sights” doctrine in a Law Against Discrimination case).
98 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. g (2015).
99 Illustration 2 to section 9.05 criticizes jury instructions regarding future economic
loss on precisely this ground.  In that case, plaintiff has been fired at age 51 and seeks
recovery of lost compensation until age 65.  The jury is instructed:
In considering what were E’s post-trial economic damages as a result of the
termination of E’s employment on April 15, 2011, you should deduct from
E’s likely earnings at X, had he remained at X, only such income that E
could have obtained in equivalent work during his work expectancy.  If E
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state that “as courts have become more receptive to claims of reasona-
bly certain economic loss, courts should evaluate the reasonableness
of mitigation efforts over time.”100  That is undoubtedly true, but does
not explain why the standard used should be lowered.  In any event,
to the extent any change is envisioned, the Restatement is less solici-
tous of employees than the case law, which rarely articulates any such
rule and sometimes explicitly rejects it.101  It would be preferable to
simply continue the current majority rule, which would apply the
same standard to whether mitigation was required regardless of how
much time passes.  Such a rule would also be more consistent with the
Shirley MacLaine illustration.102
The Proposed Final Draft had several notable omissions concern-
ing mitigation, but the reporters are to be applauded for addressing
these in the final version.  Thus, the Restatement now not only en-
dorses placing the burden of proving a failure to mitigate on the
employer103 but also makes clear that the burden cannot be met by
mere proof that the employee failed to make reasonable efforts; the
employer must also show “that such efforts would have succeeded.”104
could not obtain equivalent work during this period, your award should
reflect only the earnings E could be expected to have received at X had he
remained there through normal retirement age.
Id. § 9.05, illus. 2.  Any verdict based on this instruction is called:
[S]ubject to challenge . . . because by limiting reasonable avoidable loss to
“equivalent work,” the instruction takes too restrictive a view of the avoida-
ble losses appropriate in assessing future economic loss over such an ex-
tended period of time. . . . The “equivalent work” aspect of the instruction
understates E’s obligation to make reasonable mitigation efforts.  E is not
required to accept lower-paid or other noncomparable employment for a reasonable
period of time to allow E to find employment comparable in earnings and
status to the position E had with X. Beyond such reasonable time, E cannot
refuse all other work for 14 years and collect full compensation for those years from
X.
Id. (emphasis added) (cross-references omitted).
100 Id. § 9.01, cmt. g (cross-references omitted).
101 See EEOC v. Pape Lift, Inc., 115 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We also reject
Pape’s argument that after a period of looking for work unsuccessfully, Waters was obli-
gated to ‘lower his sights’ in order to procure employment.”); Karl v. City of Mountlake
Terrace, No. C09-1806RSL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40561, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 4, 2011)
(“Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has adopted the lower sights doc-
trine. . . . Because the higher courts have not adopted the principle, this Court declines to
do so.”); Elder v. Mike Dorian Ford, No. 244530, No. 244798, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS
3149, at *16–17 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (finding no error in failing to instruct the jury as to
a lowered sights doctrine).
102 See supra note 88–90 and accompanying text. R
103 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. f (2015); see, e.g., McAleer v. McNally Pitts-
burg Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1964) (placing burden of proving failure to
mitigate on employer); Pratt v. Bd. of Educ. of Uintah Cnty. Sch. Dist., 564 P.2d 294,
297–98 (Utah 1977) (same).
104 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. f (2015).  This is consistent with most case
law. See DOBBS, supra note 20, § 12.21(2) (“The claim is reduced . . . only if suitable substi- R
tute employment was available . . . .”); see also Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 864
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There is, however, some tension between this statement and Illustra-
tion 7 to section 9.01, which concludes that E “did not make reasona-
ble efforts to mitigate losses” and might be read to suggest that a
deduction is appropriate without a further showing that such efforts,
if made, would have been successful.105
Another omission in the Proposed Final Draft that the Reporters
are to be complimented for addressing in the published product is
the collateral-source rule.  As it is usually stated, income from certain
“collateral” sources does not count as mitigation.  Although this rule
has had a checkered history in tort law,106 it has generally been ap-
plied in the employment context when a discharged employee re-
ceives unemployment compensation, with most courts focusing on
this issue holding that such benefits are treated as collateral
sources.107  The Restatement now notes that “ ‘[c]ollateral source’ in-
come from private or social insurance is generally not deducted from
damages.”108
(3d Cir. 1995) (“To meet its burden, an employer must demonstrate that 1) substantially
equivalent work was available, and 2) the Title VII claimant did not exercise reasonable
diligence to obtain the employment.”).  In the Title VII arena, however, some courts have
equated proof of failure of reasonable efforts with proof that such efforts would have re-
sulted in substantially equivalent employment. See e.g., Broadnax v. City of New Haven, 415
F.3d 265, 270 (2d Cir. 2005) (the employer need not show comparable employment was
available so long as it carries its “burden on the issue of whether the plaintiff made no
reasonable efforts to seek alternative employment”); Quint v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d
1, 15–16 (1st Cir. 1999) (reaching the same conclusion as the Broadnax court).  The Re-
statement is to be praised for rejecting this view.
In an economy with persistent high unemployment, the employer’s futility showing
will often not be easy to satisfy. See Stremple v. Nicholson, 289 F. App’x 571, 574–75 (3d
Cir. 2008) (plaintiff made reasonable attempts to mitigate in light of (a) the highly special-
ized nature of his former position, (b) his unsuccessful applications for chief of surgery in
the few suitable hospitals in the area, and (c) the prohibitive costs of malpractice insurance
given his financial position; plaintiff’s ceasing to maintain his license was a financial neces-
sity and not a disqualifying factor with respect to the award).
105 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, illus. 7 (2015).  Illustration 9 does not pose this
problem because the employee in that example turns down proffered substitute work.
However, its phrasing—“B has not reasonably mitigated his damages”—might imply that
Illustration 7 was dealing only with the employee’s duty to make reasonable efforts. Id.
§ 9.01, illus. 9.
106 See generally Adam G. Todd, An Enduring Oddity: The Collateral Source Rule in the Face
of Tort Reform, the Affordable Care Act, and Increased Subrogation, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 965
(2012) (discussing the effect tort legislation and the increased use and application of sub-
rogation have had on the collateral-source rule).
107 See the cases collected in the Reporters’ Notes to RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW
§ 9.01, cmt. f (2015). See generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Contract
Damages, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 70 (1983) (rejecting decisions that claim that the collateral-
source rule is limited to torts and inapplicable to contracts); Joseph M. Perillo, The Collat-
eral Source Rule in Contract Cases, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 705, 713–14 (2009) (stating that the
great weight of authority applies the collateral-source rule to unemployment benefits, a
result that is justified by viewing those benefits as an insurance policy paid for by the em-
ployee’s providing her services).
108 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.01, cmt. f (2015).
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Before I end this comparison of damages remedies for breach of
contract, however, it is appropriate to interject a dose of reality into
this discussion of an employer’s remedies.  Employees are, by and
large, judgment proof.109  Damage remedies, therefore, are more the-
oretic than real; as a practical matter, the ability of an employer to fire
a worker—either at will or for cause where the employee enjoys some
form of job security—is often the most meaningful “remedy”
available.
Thus, the Restatement’s approach to employee remedies is con-
siderably more important in practical terms than its approach to em-
ployer remedies, and the shortcomings of the Restatement on this
point are the more important.  That said, however, there are two situa-
tions in which the reach of employer remedies is important.  First and
most obvious is the case of highly compensated employees against
whom a claim for substantial damages, including lost profits, may be
plausible.  We will encounter this possibility again in connection with
employer remedies against employees for torts.  Second is employer
deployment of counterclaims against employees suing for violation of
statutory rights.110  Such counterclaims, if plausible, can affect the set-
tlement value of a lawsuit by reducing the probable recovery for a
plaintiff.
C. Injunctive Relief for Torts
Employment Law limits employee rights to an injunction “only in
cases of continuing torts,”111 a term not otherwise defined and seem-
ingly with little application to the torts the Restatement imagines an
employer committing against an employee—defamation, wrongful in-
terference, and misrepresentation.112  Since an injunction would, of
109 E.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 P.2d 486, 505 (Colo. 1989) (employee was
judgment proof); cf. Majano v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 2d 136, 145 n.7 (D.D.C. 2008)
(stating that many courts “apply the scope-of-employment test very expansively, in part
because doing so usually allows an injured tort plaintiff a chance to recover from a deep-
pocket employer rather than a judgment-proof employee”).
110 See, e.g., Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., 06 Civ. 589 (GEL), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48126, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007) (“faithless servant” counterclaim brought
against plaintiff suing for sexual harassment by MSG executive Isiah Thomas); see generally
Charles A. Sullivan, Mastering The Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract
Law, and Fiduciary Duty, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 777, 779 (2011) (“[S]ome see a growing risk that
the [faithless servant] doctrine is being asserted to discourage employees from bringing
anti-discrimination or other claims against their employers.”).
111 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.06(a) (2015).  The term is sometimes used to avoid
a statute of limitations by, for example, focusing on the continuing operation of a nuisance
rather than the original creation of it. See Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d
1265, 1267–68 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing continuing nuisance doctrine); see also Winn-
Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 746 F.3d 1008, 1043 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e believe
that Florida law recognizes a continuing violation principle when restrictive covenants are
violated by ongoing, separate acts.”).
112 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW ch. 6 (2015).
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course, not be available other than to challenge continuing conduct,
the limitation on such relief seems most aimed at the tort of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy tort,113 but the Restatement ex-
plicitly provides that “courts will not reinstate employees to their lost
employment.”114  In short, the Restatement basically confines employ-
ees who are the victims of torts to damages relief only.115
This approach to employee remedies for the public-policy tort is
of debatable consistency with the decided cases.  Although scholars
have questioned the effectiveness of reinstatement, even under statu-
tory regimes where it is explicit remedy,116 a number of jurisdictions
would, in theory at least, permit reinstatement for a discharge in viola-
tion of public policy.117  However, it is true that, even among these,
most cases seem to offer the plaintiff front pay in lieu of reinstate-
ment.118  To the extent that the reinstatement remedy is mainly a
113 Id. § 5.01.
114 Id. § 9.06(b).  This is qualified by “unless specifically authorized by law,” which
would seem to apply only to statutes so providing.
115 The list of cases in the Reporters’ Note to section 9.06, mostly relating to statutory
claims, does not require any reconsideration of this conclusion.
116 See, e.g., Robert Covington, Remedies Doctrines in Employment Law: Ready to Be Restated,
or in Need of Remedial Attention?, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 511, 520 n.23 (2012); Samuel
Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753
(1990); Martha S. West, The Case Against Reinstatement in Wrongful Discharge, 1988 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 28–40 (looking to empirical studies documenting the ineffectiveness of reinstate-
ment even in labor law cases where unions are typically involved and arguing that reinstate-
ment is likely to be even more ineffective without a union to police the employer’s
subsequent conduct).
117 E.g., Skirpan v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 83 C 0447, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8637, 8
(N.D. Ill. July 20, 1989) (“Although we have found no Illinois case law which explicitly
states that reinstatement is proper in a retaliatory discharge case, we hold that reinstate-
ment is a natural remedy for this tort which was created to prevent wrongful discharge.  No
other remedy can fully compensate an employee for the wrongful loss of his or her job.”);
Redemske v. Romeoville, 406 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. 1980) (affirming an order requiring the
village to reinstate the plaintiff who had been wrongfully discharged for participating in a
political parade); Coffey v. Fayette Tubular Prods., 929 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Tenn. 1996)
(“[V]irtually all courts agree that the clearest way to make the plaintiff whole is to supple-
ment the back pay award with reinstatement to the job . . . .”); Peters v. Rivers Edge Min-
ing, Inc., 680 S.E.2d 791, 811–12 (W. Va. 2009) (“[R]einstatement has evolved into an
accepted remedy for the tort of retaliatory discharge.”); Kempfer v. Automated Finishing,
564 N.W.2d 692, 701 (Wis. 1997) (“[T]he circuit court must first determine whether rein-
statement is feasible.  If the circuit court concludes that reinstatement is not feasible then
the court rather than the jury should determine the amount of front pay, if any, that is
necessary to make the wronged employee whole.”).
118 See Coffey, 929 S.W.2d at 331–32 (“Perhaps the most common circumstance render-
ing reinstatement infeasible is ‘where the employer has demonstrated such extreme hostil-
ity that, as a practical matter, a productive and amicable working relationship would be
impossible . . . .’  Where reinstatement is not feasible, the court may order front pay . . . .”
(citation omitted)); Peters, 680 S.E.2d at 812 (“Not all cases, though, present the right cir-
cumstances for an employee’s reinstatement.  When the wrongful discharge is precipitated
by or results in a hostile relationship between the employee and the employer, reinstate-
ment is not appropriate.  In such circumstances, we have recognized front pay as an accept-
able substitute for reinstatement.”); see also Macglashan v. ABS LINCS KY, Inc., 448 S.W.3d
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pass-through for a damage remedy which Employment Law deals with in
a separate section,119 it may be simplifying the law rather than chang-
ing it to employees’ disadvantage.
On the other hand, although it allows such damages recovery, the
Restatement stresses the difficulties of establishing “reasonably certain
future economic loss,”120 and providing front pay will sometimes re-
duce these difficulties.  Thus, front pay may be awarded either for de-
ferred reinstatement (as when another employee is currently
occupying the position plaintiff will be awarded when it is vacant) or
in lieu of reinstatement (when that remedy is simply not feasible, as
where there is mutual hostility).  Front pay for delayed reinstatement
obviously narrows the time line and thus reduces the computational
problems although “in lieu of” front pay poses the same difficulties as
damages for future economic loss.  In at least some cases, reinstate-
ment may well be the preferred remedy and, by ruling it out, the Re-
statement removes an arrow from the wrongfully discharged
employee’s quiver.121
As for employer equitable relief, section 9.10, authorizing injunc-
tive relief for an employee’s breach of a “tort-based duty, including a
fiduciary duty,” contains no limitation, other than a reminder that the
employer “must satisfy the traditional requirements for obtaining
equitable relief.”122  Comment a indicates that the section applies to a
breach of an obligation enforceable under Chapter 8,123 but presuma-
bly only to breaches of the duty of loyalty while employed or misap-
propriation of trade secrets (since enforcement of noncompetition
clauses would fall under section 9.04 for violation of a contract-based
duty124).
Chapter 8, in turn, suggests that injunctive relief will be available
to address violations of the duty of loyalty.  While there are other ap-
plications,125 perhaps the most common instance is an order
792, 794–95 (Ky. 2014) (interpreting a state whistleblower statute to authorize front pay
between the judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement).
119 See infra beginning at note 146 and accompanying text. R
120 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05, cmt. e (2015) (determining “future (i.e., post-
trial) lost earnings” poses an inquiry that is “much more difficult” than determining lost
earnings to the point of trial).
121 One could argue that reinstatement might be preferable for employers to lost future
earnings since the latter could be a substantial award for which the employer receives no
benefit in terms of services.  But an employer will often be able to avoid any award for lost
future earnings by offering plaintiffs their jobs back, thus triggering their duty to mitigate.
See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
122 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T  LAW § 9.10(a) (2015).
123 Id. § 9.10, cmt. a.
124 See id. § 9.04(b).
125 The common law would historically enforce the “negative” promise not to work for
anyone else that was implicit in a promise to work for the plaintiff for a period of time, but
it would do so only when the employee’s services were especially valuable and when the
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enjoining an employee’s or former employee’s use or disclosure of
the employer’s trade secrets (defined in section 8.03).126  The Restate-
ment approves of such injunctions in the face of actual or threatened
disclosure, but it emphatically rejects a broader doctrine called “inevi-
table disclosure.”127
When there was a sufficient basis to believe that a former em-
ployee intended to use or disclose information determined to be a
trade secret, equity has long enjoined such action.128  But the
inevitable-disclosure doctrine would go further to bar subsequent em-
ployment by a competitor firm when such employment would necessa-
rily require the former employee to use such secrets, and it would do
so absent any meaningful proof of any intent to disclose.129  The effect
is to convert trade-secret protection into protection against competi-
tion and to do so absent any agreement not to compete.130
Employment Law rejects any injunction unless “there has been ac-
tual use or disclosure of the prior employer’s trade secrets or a high
likelihood, based on the employee’s statements or conduct, that the
employee will disregard his or her obligations not to use or disclose
such information.”131  This comes down firmly on the side of employ-
ees although the Reporters’ Notes, perhaps influenced by the contri-
butions of Professor Alan Hyde during the process, make clear that
new employer was in competition with the plaintiff.  See Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. M. & G.
604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 694–95 (1852).  This use of injunctions continues where its restric-
tive conditions are met. E.g., Bryan McDonagh S.C. v. Moss, 565 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990).
126 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.03 (2015).
127 Id. § 8.05, cmt. a.
128 See, e.g., Baxter Intern Inc. v. Morris, 976 F.2d 1189, 1193 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting
that Missouri courts generally “will grant equitable protection for an employer’s interest in
trade secrets”).
129 The seminal case is Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 21 1262 (7th Cir. 1995), which
the Reporters’ Notes suggest “could have been decided on the narrower theory of
threatened disclosure.” RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.05 (2015) (citing Alan Hyde, The
Story of Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond: How the Doctrine of the Inevitable Disclosure of the Trade Secrets
of Marketing Sports Beverages Was Brewed, in EMPLOYMENT LAW STORIES 130–31 (Samuel Es-
treicher & Gillian Lester eds., 2007)).
130 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.05, cmt. b & illus. 2 (2015).
131 Id. § 8.05, cmt. b.  The comment goes on:
[A]n injunction here requires a demanding showing including that: (1) the
former and current employers are direct competitors; (2) the employee’s
new position is sufficiently similar to the old position, so that (3) the em-
ployee could not fulfill the new responsibilities without using or disclosing
the former employer’s trade secrets; and (4) the former employee has ex-
pressly threatened such use or disclosure, or the employee’s conduct dem-
onstrates a pattern of deceit or misappropriation of trade secrets and other
confidential information indicating that ethical constraints and a court in-
junction barring the disclosure or use of trade secrets would, standing
alone, be inadequate to protect the former employer’s legitimate interests.
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there are very few cases adopting an inevitable-disclosure principle
that would apply without regard to threatened disclosure.132
D. Damages for Torts
Employee tort damages are robust under the Restatement.  Sec-
tion 9.05(a) subjects the employer to liability in damages “for foresee-
able harms caused by the wrong,”133 subject, of course, to
mitigation.134  These damages “include past and reasonably certain fu-
ture economic loss, noneconomic loss, the expenses of reasonable ef-
forts to mitigate damages, and reasonably foreseeable consequential
damages.”135  Further, an employee “may also recover punitive dam-
ages if the employer was sufficiently culpable, or nominal damages if
no actual damages are proven.”136  There is little to quarrel about in
the blackletter.
Below the 30,000-foot level, however, the Restatement provides
relatively little guidance on what these various types of damages might
be.  For example, with respect to punitive damages, comment g essen-
tially repeats hornbook law that requires “conduct that is outrageous,
because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to
the rights of others.”137  It notes, but does not take any position, with
respect to “several jurisdictions [that] restrict punitive awards where
the underlying conduct is not committed by a corporate officer or
managerial agent,”138  or “require that punitive awards bear a reasona-
132 See id. § 8.05, illus. 2.  The Reporters’ Notes reject liability in “the starker situation”
lacking “any showing of deception or other improper behavior by the employee.  The
courts generally deny relief in this situation. . . .” Id. § 8.05, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. b.
133 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05(a) (2015).
134 Id. at cmt c.
135 Id. § 9.05(b).
136 Id.
137 Id. § 9.05, cmt. 5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979)).
138 Id. § 9.05, cmt. g. The Reporters’ Notes quote section 217C of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency as establishing a principal’s liability for punitive damages for the acts
of its agents “if, but only if”:
(a) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the
scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ap-
proved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217(c) (2008).  According to the Notes, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 909 and the Restatement (Third) of Agency § 703, Comment e,
adopt a similar approach.
Section 217C has been influential, but not dispositive, in federal decisions and there-
fore the Restatement’s approval may or may not lead state courts to follow their path.
Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999), looked to section 217C to determine
when a corporate employer may be liable.  According to the Court, to recover a punitive
award, the plaintiff must prove that the agent who discriminated against her was an “im-
portant” manager. Id. at 543.  If plaintiff carries her burden on that issue, however, she
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ble relationship to the size of compensatory awards.”139  It also cau-
tions that federal constitutional constraints may limit punitive
awards.140
With respect to “economic loss,” the comments divide the uni-
verse into such loss “at the time of trial” and “reasonably certain fu-
ture economic loss.”141  The former is treated in comment d, which
somewhat oddly looks to the Restatement (Second) of Torts sec-
tion 924(b) as recognizing “loss or impairment of earning capacity” as
“a compensable element of harm to the person.”142  While an employer
does not necessarily prevail.  Believing that literally applying section 217C would create
perverse incentives by punishing an employer who attempts to comply with the law, the
Kolstad Court rejected vicarious liability even for the discrimination of managerial agents
“where these decisions are contrary to the employer’s ‘good-faith efforts to comply with
Title VII.’” Id. at 545. See EEOC v. Mgmt. Hospitality of Racine, Inc., 666 F.3d 422, 438–39
(7th Cir. 2012) (punitive award was appropriate because the employer’s sexual harassment
policy was insufficient when it could be understood to discourage complaints, it was not
made available in writing to employees and could be accessed only with management’s
approval, and the employer did not educate managers or workers about sexual harassment
and how to handle complaints).
139 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05 cmt. g (2015).  This is an interesting, albeit un-
certain, area.  At the federal level the question has arisen as to whether a punitive award
can be made if there is no supporting compensatory award (or a backpay award).  Some
courts have held yes. See Saunders v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 526 F.3d 142, 153 (4th
Cir. 2008) (agreeing with sister circuits that no compensatory damages are necessary for a
punitive award and rejecting proportionality analysis when nominal damages are
awarded); Abner v. Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[A] punitive
damages award under Title VII and § 1981 need not be accompanied by compensatory
damages.  We base our holding on the language of the statute, its provision of a cap, and
the purpose of punitive damages under Title VII.”), but other courts require either com-
pensatory damages or backpay to support for an award of punitive damages. See Quint v.
A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 172 F.3d 1, 14 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999).  The debate is largely independent
of the constitutional question of the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
perhaps because Title VII’s cap on damages pretermits what might otherwise be a constitu-
tional question.
140 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05 cmt. g (2015) (“Constitutional principles, under
the federal due-process clause, also require that the size of a punitive-damages award be
reasonably related to the size of the compensatory-damages award in a given case, and that
appellate courts engage in meaningful review of punitive awards across cases.”).  The refer-
ence is to cases such as BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (a punitive
damages award that is “grossly excessive” violates due process), and State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (setting a presumptive constitutional cap on
punitive damages by limiting them to a single-digit ratio to compensatory damages). See
generally Joseph A. Seiner, Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment Discrimination, 97
IOWA L. REV. 473 (2012) (proposing an analytical framework for analyzing punitive dam-
ages in cases brought under Title VII); Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Dam-
ages for Employment Discrimination Cases, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 701 (2010) (describing the
analytic red herrings that may confuse courts conducting an excessiveness review to illus-
trate fundamental flaws with such review and suggesting ways to minimize mistakes); San-
dra F. Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227 (2009)
(describing three problematic analytical mechanisms that cause judicial preemption of pu-
nitive damages and the distinct harms associated with each).
141 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05, cmts. d, e (2015).
142 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05, cmt. d (2015) (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(b) (1979).
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may commit such a tort with respect to its workers, the basic torts
dealt with by the Restatement are dignitary or economic and so look-
ing to a source dealing with harm to the person is somewhat strange
although not objectionable.  Nevertheless, the comment approves the
employee’s right to recover “the amount of earnings he has been pre-
vented from acquiring up to the time of the trial.  This amount is the
difference between what he probably could have earned but for the
harm and any lesser sum that he actually earned in any employment”
or what he would have earned by reasonable mitigation.143  This
seems like a somewhat long-winded way of allowing recovery for the
compensation that would have been earned but for the tort (minus
mitigation).  But the comment also approves of recovery of “[o]ther
economic losses,” such as “reasonable relocation, medical, and other
expenses.”144
Comment e then turns to “Reasonably certain future economic
loss” and, as the title suggests, recognizes more difficulties in ascer-
taining “future (i.e., post-trial) lost income” than determining past
lost earnings.145  For example, the fact that a former employee has
been unable to find comparable alternative employment up to the
time of trial does not necessarily mean that she will be unable to do so
for the rest of her working life.  Nevertheless, the comment provides:
This Section adopts the view . . . that ordinarily the trier of fact
should be allowed to consider whether claims of future economic
loss are well-founded by assessing the injured party’s probable com-
pensation over his likely work expectancy minus earnings the em-
ployee would, or could (through reasonable effort), obtain had he
not been injured.  [The courts taking this view] do not require ex-
pert vocational testimony in all cases but do insist on a reasonable
factual basis for awarding damages for future economic loss.146
Illustration 1 would permit an employee wrongfully discharged at
age 51 to recover an amount measured by a 14-year work expectancy
at an average annual future income of $42,642, “a figure that falls
between the highest salary E earned at X (over $50,000) less the
$20,000 E earned the year following his termination.”147
Although the jury award it approves may be sustained, this exam-
ple is over-simplistic and perhaps deceptive.148  First, the 14-year work
143 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 924(b) (1979).
144 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05, cmt. d (2015).
145 Id. § 9.05, cmt. e.
146 Id.
147 Id. § 9.05, illus. 1.
148 One problem is mitigation.  The Illustration supposes a jury award of $597,000,
reflecting a yearly average lost earnings of $46,642, multiplied by 14 years of working life.
But the plaintiff earned $20,000 the year after his termination from a job paying $50,000,
suggesting that his recovery, for that first year at least, was only $30,000. Id.
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expectancy seems to envision the plaintiff retiring at 65; while the
comment notes that that is conceded to be the plaintiff’s anticipated
retirement date, nothing in the law that would require such a conces-
sion in a real case.149  An employee, depending on the job and his
health and financial situation, may have a longer or shorter projected
working life.
Second, the calculation does not address either inflation150 or re-
duction to present value.151  While the Introductory Note to Chapter
9 cautions that the “Illustrations offered below ignore complications
such as reducing future awards to present value, adjusting for pro-
jected inflation”152 it might have been better to repeat that caution in
connection with these discussing future economic loss where they are
most likely to arise.  Thus, if X’s salary was $50,000 the year before his
discharge, even modest inflation over a 14-year period would dramati-
cally increase the annual lost income toward the end of the period.153
And the possibility of “real wage” increases—raises above inflation—
should have been noted.154  Similarly, reducing the recovery to pre-
sent value would be a normal adjustment in tort law.155
Finally, as to “noneconomic loss,” the comments are singularly
unhelpful.  Comment f provides that “[d]amages for emotional harm
are normally available for intentional torts like assault, battery, false
imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, and defamation.”156  Presumably, a discharge in violation of
the public policy tort would be an intentional tort triggering a right to
mental distress damages, and, although an explicit reference would
have been better, the Reporters’ Notes cite several such cases.157  Nor
149 See id.
150 See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 538 (1983) (noting
that “ours is not an inflation-free economy.  Inflation has been a permanent fixture in our
economy for many decades . . . .”).
151 See, e.g., Dennis v. Blanchfield, 428 A.2d 80, 85 (Md. 1981) (reversible error “to
refuse to instruct the jury in a personal injury action that they are to reduce to present
value any damages awarded for the loss of future earning capacity”).
152 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW, Introductory Note to Chapter 9 (2015).  The Note
also indicates that the illustrations do not “account[ ] for pre- and post-judgment interest
where available under applicable law.” Id.
153 For example, a 3% inflation rate would yield a final year salary in excess of $75,000.
154 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 209 (2010).
155 See, e.g., Dennis, 428 A.2d at 85 (reversible error “to refuse to instruct the jury in a
personal injury action that they are to reduce to present value any damages awarded for
the loss of future earning capacity”).  Sometimes inflation and reduction to present value
are both ignored in the expectation they will offset each other, but this is very problematic.
LAYCOCK, supra note 154, at 208–09. R
156 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.05, cmt. f (2015).
157 Id. § 9.05, Reporters’ Notes, cmt. f (citing Wiskotoni v. Mich. Nat’l Bank-W., 716
F.2d 378, 388–89 (6th Cir. 1983); Scott v. Otis Elevator Co., 572 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1990);
Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 531 N.W.2d 144, 148–50 (Mich. 1995).
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is there any reference to the kinds of proof that may be needed to
establish emotional distress.158
The Restatement’s expansive view of an employee’s tort recovery
is matched by an expansive view of the employer’s recovery when the
employee is the tortfeasor.  Section 9.09 begins by replicating the em-
ployee’s tort recovery.159  The comments to this section cross-refer to
those for section 9.05,160 so the parallelism is obvious.  While Employ-
ment Law does not note it, the same principles will often differ in their
application in the two contexts.  For example, where the employee—a
single human being—is the tortfeasor, the agency concerns with
158 In the employment-discrimination context, courts have tended to require expert
medical evidence to justify substantial awards under this heading.  While emotional-distress
damages are recoverable under antidiscrimination laws, there is less agreement as to how
such distress can be proved.  While some courts find the plaintiff’s uncorroborated testi-
mony sufficient, McInerney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 463 F. App’x 709, 723–24 (10th Cir.
2011) (plaintiff’s testimony about the stress of losing her job, in tandem with testimony
about the stress of caring for her premature son and recovering from pregnancy complica-
tions sufficient for granting compensatory damages); Tucker v. Hous. Auth., 229 F. App’x
820, 826–27 (11th Cir. 2007) (trial court within its discretion to refuse a new trial or remit-
titur when plaintiff testified as to his depression, anxiety, loss of sleep, digestive problems,
and humiliation, including pretending to go to work to avoid alarming his young daugh-
ter); Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust, 433 F.3d 558, 566 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding
$100,000 pain-and-suffering award since medical testimony not necessary to prove emo-
tional injury in a Title VII case), several circuits have found uncorroborated testimony by
the plaintiff of her emotional harm a basis for finding damage awards grossly excessive.
E.g., Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 32–33 (1st Cir. 2012) (despite plaintiff’s
and his wife’s testimony, a $500,000 award for emotional distress was grossly excessive
where there was no evidence of medical treatment or counseling; “While evidence from a
physician or other mental health professional is not a sine qua non to an award of damages
for emotional distress, the absence of such evidence is relevant in assessing the amount of
such an award.”); Akouri v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 2005)
($552,000 compensatory damages award properly overturned when plaintiff presented no
evidence of emotional distress except for mentioning “he was rejected the three times he
applied for promotions that he believed he deserved”); Forshee v. Waterloo Indus., Inc.,
178 F.3d 527, 531 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Forshee suffered no physical injury, she was not medi-
cally treated for any psychological or emotional injury, and no other witness corroborated
any outward manifestation of emotional distress.”).  Accordingly, an expert’s testimony is
at least helpful and may be necessary. See Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. of Carbondale, 625
F.3d 394, 408–10 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding remitted award of $250,000; although the
employee suffered only a mild adverse employment action, the award was supported by a
clinical professional counselor’s testimony that the employee was suffering from adjust-
ment disorder, depression, and anxiety based on work-related stress and fear of losing his
job).
159 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.09 (2015) provides:
(a) An employee who breaches a tort-based duty or any fiduciary duty the
employee owes the employer (Chapter 8) is subject to liability for foresee-
able harm to the employer caused by the breach . . . less damages that the
employer could reasonably have avoided.
(b) Available items of damages that may be obtained under (a) include
past and reasonably certain future economic loss and noneconomic loss,
punitive damages, reasonably foreseeable lost profits, and reasonably fore-
seeable consequential damages.
There is an obvious overlap between these categories.
160 Id. § 9.09, cmts. b, e.
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imposing liability on the principal are inapplicable.161  Further,
where, as will usually be the case, the employer is a business entity,
“noneconomic loss” in the form of mental distress will be unavailable.
Finally, again not mentioned by the Restatement, there will be
serious causation and ascertainability issues, present in many cases
where the employer sues, that are not applicable where the employee
is the plaintiff.  For example, when a worker is wrongfully discharged,
the lost compensation is typically easily ascertainable (even if mitiga-
tion and the length of such loss introduce complications).  In con-
trast, where the employee breaches, the employer will often find it
difficult to prove causation of damages or to quantify the harm caused
to the sufficient degree of certainty.162
These problems of proof may in large part explain the remainder
of section 9.09, which provides employers with two kinds of recoveries
beyond traditional damages:
(c) . . . [A]n employer may deny any compensation owed, and re-
cover any compensation paid, to an employee who breaches the em-
ployee’s fiduciary duty of loyalty owed the employer (§ 8.01), where
(1) the employee’s compensation cannot be apportioned
between the employee’s disloyal services and the employee’s
loyal services, and
(2) the nature of the employee’s disloyalty is such that
there is no practicable method for making a reasonable
calculation of the harm caused the employer by the employee’s
disloyal services.163
If the employee’s compensation can be reasonably apportioned be-
tween the employee’s loyal and disloyal services, then the employer
may deny any compensation owed, and recover any compensation
paid, for the disloyal services.
(d) If an employee personally profits from a breach of fiduciary
duty, the employer can recover those profits from the employee.164
These paragraphs deal with what is sometimes called the “faith-
less servant” rule, which I have discussed at length elsewhere.165  For
present purposes, it is enough to note that the additional remedies—
disgorgement of compensation paid and payment of profits earned—
are much more draconian than contract law usually provides.  Never-
theless, the Restatement did not invent the faithless servant rule,
161 See supra text accompanying note 139. R
162 See Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Janien, 624 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (N.Y. 1993) (permitting
former employer to recover lost profits from breaching employee because they could be
proven with reasonable certainty).
163 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 9.09(c) (2015). This paragraph is qualified by
“[e]xcept to the extent the employer would obtain double recovery for the same loss, and
subject to applicable state wage-payment law or other law. . . .” Id.
164 Id. § 9.09(d).
165 Sullivan, supra note 110, at 779. R
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which has deep roots in agency and fiduciary law.  Indeed, although
the rule was mostly applied to high-level employees, the Restatement
does a service by explicitly attempting to narrow the application of any
such rule in the employment context.  It does this in section 8.01 by
dividing the duty of loyalty into two parts:
Employees in a position of trust and confidence with their employer
owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the employer in matters related to
their employment.  [E]mployees . . . . may, depending on the na-
ture of the employment position, owe an implied contractual duty
of loyalty to the employer in matters related to their
employment.166
Section 9.09, however, is explicit that only those who owe a fiduci-
ary duty (not those who have an “implied contractual duty of loyalty”)
may be liable for the remedies in paragraphs (c) and (d).167  Finally,
the Restatement does a genuine service in making clear that disgorge-
ment and forfeiture apply only when reasonable apportionment of
faithful and faithless service is not possible.
In summary, as compared to current law, the Restatement is em-
ployee friendly with regard to the faithless servant rule, both by con-
fining it to fiduciaries and by preferring apportionment when
possible.  It nevertheless remains a very draconian remedial structure
for employees with no parallel for employer harms.
FINAL ASSESSMENT
As far as Remedies is concerned, the new Restatement is very
much a mixed bag.  Perhaps the most obvious conclusion is one we
did not need a Restatement to know: the law’s remedial scheme gen-
erally favors employers although this may largely stem from the reality
that most employees are judgment proof or at least not worth pursu-
ing for whatever money might be collected.  That is, this may largely
explain the law’s slant towards injunctive relief for employers.  As for
enhanced monetary remedies against faithless servants, the explana-
tion is probably more historical than logical, stemming from an ill-
defined “fiduciary” notion that transitioned from trust law through
various confidential relationships into what we now know as employ-
ment law.168
The Restatement, however, does not often tilt the playing field
further towards employers and sometimes makes modest efforts to
level it.  Its disapproval of the inevitable-disclosure rule comes to
mind.  Further, some of its innovations—a new test for modifying
166 RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 8.01(a) (2015).
167 See id.
168 See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 802–08 (1983) (discuss-
ing the modern extension of fiduciary law in general).
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overbroad restrictive covenants—might be of some utility in this re-
gard.  Nevertheless, other policy choices—the lowered-sights doctrine
and the rejection of reinstatement for employees discharged in viola-
tion of public policy—seem very dubious.  As for its reformulation of
the rules about enforcing restrictive covenants, the blackletter might
or might not do some good in curtailing the unconsidered spread of
such covenants.  Finally, in some respects Employment Law failed to ad-
dress issues of potential importance where it could have made some
improvements or at least offered useful guidance.
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